I'm an Assistant Professor (Juniorprofessor) of Quantitative Macroeconomics at the University of Mannheim. I specialize in Macroeconomics, in particular in 1. inequality; 2. consumption; and 3. (price) search theory. My technical interests also cover computational economics and (applied) statistical learning.
You can find my CV here.
How are income fluctuations transmitted to consumption decisions if the law of one price does not hold? I propose a novel and tractable framework to study search for consumption as part of the optimal savings problem. Due to frictions in the retail market, households have to exert some effort to purchase the consumption good. This effort has two components: 1. effort to search for price bargains; 2. effort required to purchase consumption of a given size. These two motives are necessary to replicate two seemingly contradictory shopping patterns observed in the data, namely: higher time spent shopping by the unemployed and retirees and (conditioned on being employed) the positive elasticity of shopping time with respect to labor income. The former is well known in the literature, while the latter is new and I document it using data from the American Time Use Survey. The model allows me to reconcile the traditional savings theory with households' shopping behavior in a quantitatively meaningful way. As I show frictions in the purchasing technology generate important macroeconomic implications for modeling inequality and, in general, household consumption.
In this article, I study equilibrium properties of a standard model of endogenous price distribution due to Burdett and Judd (1983). In search economies of this type in most cases there are two dispersed equilibria, low-search and high-search one. I show that the low-search equilibrium is unstable while the high-search equilibrium is stable. What is important every allocation can be characterized only as one of those types. This finding substantially narrows the range of allocations, in which the price dispersion is stable and its form is not a temporary phenomenon. To recover the stability of every allocation I propose a refinement of the original model, which gives rise to one unique symmetric dispersed equilibrium. This equilibrium is shown to be stable and it can be used to rationalize every allocation. In addition to this, in contrast to the original model the degenerate Diamond (1971)-type equilibrium is unstable.
People who can say something more about my research agenda (and me):
At Mannheim I give following lectures:
Here you can find the (old) website with teaching materials.
The website has been visited times since 2010.